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This paper examines the similarities and differences of the legal discourses on the 
prohibition of retroactive laws within the European human rights framework, 
and more broadly, a temporal framework that accompanies questions of historical 
injustice. The paper considers the significance of the notion of retrospective 
justice in post-1989 Europe, and more specifically in Germany and Poland. From 
a criminal law perspective the idea of punishing people for an act that was not a 
crime at the time of commission is regarded as reprehensible. However, a different 
temporal narrative was evoked with the fall of Communism in 1989 that was based 
on responses to atrocities committed during the Second World War. The paper 
outlines the legal context that frames retrospective justice, nationally and regionally, 
and considers the importance of permitting the law to work retroactively. By 
examining certain aspects of the German and Polish experiences, the paper concurs 
that retrospective justice in post-Communist Europe contributes a specific set of 
problems to the field of transitional justice, none of which sit comfortably with 
one solution, and all of which demonstrate that narratives on select chapters of 
Communist histories remain unfinished. The narratives also show that transitional 
criminal justice has taken on a permanent character in legal discourses, in which 
retrospective justice takes on a dynamic meaning.
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The recent history of Central and Eastern Europe is the history of bad times.1
MAIN RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ISSUES
This paper examines the similarities and differences of the legal discourses on the 
prohibition of retroactive laws within the European human rights framework, 
and more broadly, a temporal framework that accompanies questions of historical 
injustice. The article considers the significance of the notion of retrospective 
justice in the post-dictatorial period (post-1989) in Europe, and more specifically 
in Germany and Poland. From a common law perspective, for example, the idea 
of punishing people for an act that was not a crime at the time of commission 
is regarded as reprehensible. From a temporal perspective, the idea of criminal 
law working backwards goes against principles underpinning the rule of law, 
because it is arbitrary and uncertain. However, transitional justice provides another 
lens from which to view the criminal law working retrospectively. A different 
temporal narrative was evoked with the fall of Communism in 1989, where the 
nature of the crime justifies a re-assessment of retroactive laws and punishment 
of people – usually former political leaders and other officials, who committed 
human rights violations, are inextricably entangled with accompanying dominant 
historical narratives. These narratives involve different agents and ‘relationships 
of entanglement’ or ‘multiple narratives of history and memory.’2 In this specific 
context, retrospective justice is considered an important feature of civil liberties, 
which then becomes a critical part of the transitional criminal justice narrative that 
is broadly concerned with the way in which post-dictatorial or post-conflict societies 
legally respond to past human rights atrocities.3 In order to appreciate the meanings 
of retrospective justice within the transitional criminal justice discourse, in terms of 
justice and historical narratives within a temporal framework, it is important to look 
at specific case studies, where discourses pick up and develop themes that emerge 
in relation to specific countries and other European states.
Certain events have been haunted by the persistent need to know, on the part of 
a given society, which gives the occurrences a metonymic understanding.4 In other 
words, an episode can be read as part of a country’s history, where all citizens form 
a large family because they are connected to the specific event. They can be victims 
or perpetrators or both, the latter an ambiguous context that is representative of 
both criminality and victimhood.5 Retrospective justice takes on an additional 
meaning that imbricates with the relevant agents and histories where time emerges 
in related narratives, in relation to unresolved grievances, the mourning period, the 
legal process, and/or the punishment.
1 Istvan Rev, RetRoactIve JustIce 3 (Stanford University Press 2005).
2 steve F. andeRson, technologIes oF hIstoRy: vIsual MedIa and the eccentRIcIty oF the Past 3 (Dartmouth 
College Press 2011).
3 Discussed in RutI g.teItel, tRansItIonal JustIce 27-67 (Oxford University Press 2000).
4 ReMeMbeRIng Katyn 8-9 (Alexander Etkind et al. eds., Wiley 2012).
5 Ibid.
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According to Foucault, memories and histories are always in real or potential 
conflict with other histories and memories.6 Discourses are examined to draw out 
contested aspects of memories and histories. In other words, a discourse on law 
informs politics; politics affect our perceptions of time, justice and potentially the 
law. An important dimension of this paper is to investigate which legal processes 
had a dialogue with, rather than an opposition to, official historical discourses and 
individual recollections. The aim is to address a set of problems addressed by a 
particular group or agent, rather than present a coherent narrative or even reconcile 
diverse approaches. 
The paper starts by setting out key legal definitions in national and regional legal 
frameworks in order to determine what comprises the prohibition on retroactive 
laws. Article 7 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is 
critical to the discussion. The ECHR is the masterwork of the Council of Europe, 
and has played an important role in the development of human rights’ protection in 
post-Communist Europe. The product of the Council of Europe, the ECHR has come 
to comprise a regional human rights framework that, together with the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), has engaged with the most fundamental issues 
of jurisprudence to meet its objective of human rights’ protection. Interestingly, in 
the area of retrospective justice the ECHR and accompanying case law has featured 
more prominently in some countries, and not in others. The paper outlines the 
context that frames retrospective justice and the importance of permitting the law, i.e. 
punishment, to work retroactively, based on human rights arguments and historical 
narratives peculiar to Communist histories. It specifically examines the German 
Border Guards cases. The legal reasoning of the national courts in these cases, 
later considered in two key cases by the ECtHR, effectively illustrates two things 
relevant to our discussion: (1) the context of post-1989 Communist Europe and the 
failure of legal positivism and (2) the existence of fissures in the discourses about 
natural justice and fidelity to the law that is uncovered when certain states refer to 
and use the German experience as a blueprint in formulating their own approach 
to retrospective justice. The discussion turns to Poland and presents an overview 
of its position on retrospective justice, before examining a recent ruling of the 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal from 2010. The case concerns the lifting of judicial 
immunity of judges who applied the law retrospectively in the martial law period 
(1981-1983) and raises pertinent questions about law and justice that are at the 
centre of the Border Guards cases. The legal and historical narratives on retrospective 
justice in relation to these two periods run in parallel and opposite directions, and 
importantly reveal cracks in consensual histories that bring clarity to historical 
sensibility and issues. In this fashion, the paper concurs with the contention 
that retrospective justice in post-Communist Europe contributes a defined set of 
problems to the field of transitional justice,7 none of which sit comfortably with one 
solution, and all of which demonstrate that narratives on select chapters of Communist 
histories remain unfinished, and in this way, support the contention that transitional criminal 
justice has taken on a permanent character in the law, in which retrospective justice takes on 
a dynamic meaning.
6 MIchel Foucault, the aRcheology oF Knowledge (Tavistock 1969).
7 See Adam Künzler, Judicial Legitimacy and the Role of Courts: Explaining the Transitional Context of the 
German Border Guard Cases, 32 oxFoRd J.l.s, 1-33 (2012).
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KEY DEFINITIONS
Criminal law is based on the principle of individual guilt. How it is used as a tool 
to confront past injustice reveals seemingly irreconcilable questions related to the 
criminal law essentially working backwards. This does not sit easily with the maxim 
lex retro non agit (from after the action) – a cornerstone of criminal law and a building 
block of the rule-of-law state for both common and civil law countries. For the 
common law lawyer, the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, ‘only the 
law can define a law and prescribe a penalty,’ has a long history as the fundamental 
cornerstone of criminal law, as stated by Lord Reid in Waddington v Miah:
There has for a very long time been a strong feeling against making legislation, and particularly 
criminal legislation, retrospective…I use retrospective in the sense of authorising people being 
punished for what they did before the Act came into force.8 
For Europe, this principle is found in Article 7 of the ECHR 1950,9 which 
comprises two key paragraphs:
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was 
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time 
the criminal offence was committed.
2. This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission 
which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations. 
In general, Article 7’s two dimensions prohibit the legislature and courts from 
creating or extending the law to criminalise acts or omissions that were not illegal 
at the time of their commission or omission, or to increase a penalty retroactively. 
It also expects the law to be clearly defined, as stated by the ECtHR in Achour v 
France, where ‘the criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused 
detriment.’10
Two key terms, ‘criminal offence’ and ‘penalty,’ in Article 7 have autonomous 
meanings, adhering to the Engel criteria.11 The Court emphasises that the nature of 
the offence itself and the nature and severity of the sentence, which can be imposed, 
have relevance for classification in the national law.12 These conditions apply to 
what constitutes as a penalty.13 The ECtHR closely scrutinises measures with a 
8 Waddington v Miah 59 Cr App Rep 149, 151 and 152 (1974).
9 European Convention on Human Rights art.7 1950, available at: http://human-rights-convention.
org/the-texts/(accessed 1 February 2013). Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights contains similar provisions. See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm (accessed 1 
February 2013).
10 Achour v. France 45 EHRR 9, para. 41(2007).
11 Engel and others v. The Netherlands, apps. 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, and 5370/72, Series A 
no. 22 [1979-1980] 1 EHRR 647 (8 June 1976).
12 See Lawless v. United Kingdom (No. 3) 1 EHRR 15 (1979-1980).
13 In R. v. B (RG) 1 Cr App R 19 (2010), for example, it was held that an order in 2003 extending a licence 
to a sentence of imprisonment for an offence committed 1 October 1991 did not amount to imposing 
a heavier penalty than was available at the time the offence was committed because the licence was a 
preventative measure and not a punitive one. 
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14 Welch v. United Kingdom, app. 17440/90, (9 February 1993).
15 Adamson v. United Kingdom, app. 42293/98, 26 January 1999.
16 Taylor v. United Kingdom EHRLR 90 (1998).
17 R. (Uttley) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 1 WLR 2278 (2004).
18 R. v. Bowker EWCA Crim 1608 (2007).
19 Kaftaris v. Cyprus 49 EHRR 35 (2009).
20 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 5856/72 ECHR 2 (1978)
21 h.l.a. haRt, the concePt oF law (Clarendon 1961). For a critical discussion on Hart’s notion of the 
open-textured nature of the law see Frederick Schauer, On Open Texture of Law, VIRGINIA PUBLIC LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2011-35 (2011), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1926926 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1926926  (last accessed 8 March 2013).
view as to whether they are a penalty.14 Punishment must not be disproportionate 
to the defendant’s detriment.15 However, in Taylor v. United Kingdom the European 
Commission held that the imposition of a confiscation order for offences committed 
before as well as those committed after the legislation in force was not in violation 
of Article 7.16 The Commission considered that the order was not a penalty for 
the offences committed before the Act’s implementation, but rather one for the 
later offences. In R. (Uttley) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department the House 
of Lords held that the maximum penalty within Article 7 referred to the one that 
could have been imposed by the domestic court at the time of conviction, and not 
the one that would probably have been imposed;17 this reasoning was followed 
in R. v. Bowker.18 In Kaftaris v. Cyprus, a prisoner had been given the life sentence 
for murder, which in practice involved a 20-year fixed-term sentence. Later an 
amendment to the law resulted in the sentence being replaced by an indeterminate 
sentence and, as a result, the applicant was refused discretionary release.19 The 
indeterminate life sentence was held to be a breach of Article 7 as the scope and 
level of execution of the life sentence was not formulated with sufficient precision at 
the time of his sentence.
The notion of ‘law’ presents other challenges and implies a rule of general 
application. Laws regulate the conduct of the public or a segment of society and 
operate over a period of time. In contrast to judicial decisions, which apply the 
law to persons, laws in this framework are different. As such, a law assumes some 
degree of vagueness that requires interpretation before being applied to particular 
circumstances, which the ECtHR accepts in both the Article 7 context and in respect 
of its pervasive concept of law. In this sense the law should be provided the scope 
to evolve, an element that was recognised by the Court in Tyrer.20 It is also one that 
follows the thought of key thinkers in legal philosophy, such as H.L.A. Hart and his 
theory on the ‘open-textured’ nature of law as being necessary to ensure that rules 
be interpreted according to a policy that provides for discretion; in this way laws 
are not overly rigid and able to develop with time and changing contexts, which 
adhere to the spirit of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.21 Hart’s theories are important 
features of the discussion found later in this paper. The danger is that individuals 
will end up being convicted on the basis of new developments or applications of 
the law, which could not be foreseen. Where general words in a statute have been 
interpreted by courts and a settled body of case law created, the ECtHR is likely to 
find that the requirement of certainty has been satisfied. Importantly, this flexibility 
in legal rules is found in the matrimonial rape case of SW v. United Kingdom where 
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22 SW v. United Kingdom 21 EHRR 363, paras. 36/34 (1996)
23 tRansItIonal JustIce In easteRn euRoPe and FoRMeR sovIet unIon (Lavinia Stan, ed., Routledge  2008). 
See  John P. Burgess, Coming to Terms with the East German Past, FIRst thIngs (March 1992), available at 
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/01/003-coming-to-terms-with-the-east-german-past-16 (last 
accessed 28 February 2013) and Jiří Přibáň, LegaL SymboLiSm: on Law, Time and euroPean idenTiTy 141 -163 
(Ashgate 2007). 
24 See TEITEL, supra note 3.
25 RethInKIng the Rule oF law aFteR coMMunIsM (Adam Czarnota et al. eds. CEU Press 2005); woJcIech 
saduRsKI, RIghts beFoRe couRts: a study oF constItutIonal couRts In PostcoMMunIst states oF centRal 
and easteRn euRoPe (Springer 2005). 
the Court said:
There will always be need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation to changing 
circumstances…Article 7 of the Convention cannot be read as outlawing the gradual clarification 
of the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation from case to case, provided that 
the resultant development is consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be 
foreseen.22 
In conclusion, the Court is careful to ensure that the law does not work 
retroactively in the area of criminal law, as that would offend the timeless 
cornerstone of the criminal law. The Court is concerned that terms such as criminal 
offence and penalty are clear within the member states’ national laws according to 
its own pervasive principles. The Court’s approach implies a balanced contemplation 
of what underpins the measure at hand, whether it is punitive or preventive. It 
acknowledges that laws respond to the dynamic nature of society in terms of 
relations, views on punishment for example, and what is considered a crime. 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE CONTEXT
In addition to the European human rights regime, a brief examination of time in 
the transitional justice context is needed. A comparative perspective is essential to 
our understanding of transitional justice, if we are to give it any meaning; setting 
key questions in a comparative and contextual context reveals useful similarities 
and important differences. In this respect both East Germany and Poland share 
the common experience of Communist rule, and a set of questions that present 
themselves in relation to the repressive aspects of the predecessor regime and arise 
during transition to a democracy and within the context of time.23 It is generally 
understood that the paradox of time informs the overall feeling that obligations 
stemming from transitional justice weaken over time.24 This occurs when new 
circumstances take over that postpone transitional reparation for past injustices. 
Experience, however, shows that this is not true. There are many examples of 
survivors, from atrocities committed during the Second World War, or from 
the former Communist states and Soviet bloc countries, continuing to receive or 
make claims for remedies, or seek the truth of the event.25 The notion of time in 
transitional justice entails a variety of narratives, beginning with those stemming 
from the Nuremberg legacy from 1948 to the present day.
As we shall see shortly, the application of the Radbruch formula, a theory 
conceived in reply to the atrocities of the Second World War to more recent cases of 
Agata Fijalkowski/Frontiers of Legal Research, 1(1), 2013
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egregious human rights violations, shows the timeless element of a concept of meta-
justice that is rooted in natural justice and scholarly approaches to the study of 
the genealogy of transitional justice.26 These objectives both complement and fulfil 
opposite objectives in transitional criminal justice, and, in relation to the debates 
about the relationship between national and international developments and 
entanglements, the concerns have shifted from accountability to truth versus justice, 
or official histories to access to historical records, in a key phase in the timeline of 
transitional justice.27 Temporality comes into play with respect to closure, a key 
element of the national approaches and scholarly discussions in the post-1989 
period.28
Political change is a constant feature in the stories and that also has an effect on 
the conditions of justice. What emerges, and will be shown in this paper, is that 
different notions of justice emerge in reply to specific political realities. A good 
example of this is the way in which various measures have attempted to address 
Stalinist-era injustices, ranging from creating specific legal definitions, such as 
Stalinist crimes; connecting a shared experience, such as Stalinism, to ask for a re-
evaluation of crimes against humanity and genocide; or the acceptance or rejection 
of criminally prosecuting former leaders of the predecessor regime. The truth of an 
event is underpinned and indeed at times driven by punishment. With the passage 
of time, the question has been viewed as an inheritance of a moral legacy and the 
manner in which the successor state and generation deals with its predecessor’s 
crimes. Eventually, with inevitable practicalities, such as the death of perpetrators 
and victims, the form a redress assumes is largely symbolic, which could facilitate a 
successor state’s reply to old obligations and legacies and secure its political identity 
over time. In this way, we can argue that there is a paradox of time that includes 
features of closure, remembering, forgetting, amnesia and memorialisation. These 
discourses have an effect on transitional justice and its key agents. 
GERMAN CASE STUDY
Textbooks on European human rights law will remind readers that the ECHR was 
drafted in the outcome of the Second World War, when it was likely that those 
responsible for drafting Article 7 would have had developments in Germany in 
mind as well as other parts of Europe in the 1930s, when newly imposed totalitarian 
regimes passed retroactive laws, making criminal without warning, acts which had 
been lawful under democratic rule.29 The legal innovations of pre-war Europe (1918-
1939) were cut short, but legal templates survived to be consulted in more recent 
times.30 The change of political regimes in Central and Eastern Europe following the 
26 See Künzler, supra note 7; Peter E. Quint, The Border Guards Trials and the East German Past - Seven 
Arguments, 48 A.J.C.L 541-572 (2000). See also Stanley L. Paulson & Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch and the 
Positivist Theses, 13 law and PhIlosoPhy, 313-359 (1994); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law 
and Morals, 71 haRvaRd l.R. 593-629 (1958) and Lon. L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to 
Professor Hart, 71 haRvaRd l.R, 630-672 (1958).
27 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 haRvaRd h.R.J. 69-94 (2003).
28 Ibid. See also Přibáň, supra note 23.
29 See R.c.a. whIte & c. ovey, Jacobs, whIte and ovey; the euRoPean conventIon on huMan RIghts 
(Oxford University Press 2010).
30 agata FIJalKowsKI, FRoM old tIMes to new euRoPe (Ashgate 2010).
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collapse of Communism in 1989 was also an extreme period, owing to the nature of 
the changeover to democratic rule. These political changes were often accompanied 
by a strong desire to bring to justice those responsible for the worst excesses of the 
old regime, resonating with the situation following the fall of the German Nazi 
regime in 1945, when the international community developed the ‘Nuremberg 
principles’. These principles permitted individuals to be prosecuted for acts so 
heinous as to be classified as ‘crimes against humanity,’31 even if these same acts 
had not been criminal according to Nazi legislation and practice. The position is 
expressed in the second paragraph of Article 7. In the key case of Papon v France, the 
Court rejected the applicant’s argument that at his trial for war crimes it had been a 
breach of Article 7 for the Court to adopt a broader interpretation of Article 6 of the 
Nuremberg Statute, which removed the need to prove intent as part of an accessory 
to such a crime to serve as an instrument of the Nazi’s totalitarian policy.32
East Germany, or the German Democratic Republic (GDR) came into existence 
in 1949. It was the culmination of two opposing political and military blocs, west 
and east, driven by the United States and Soviet Union respectively, that resulted 
in the GDR being increasingly dominated by the Communists alone and the state 
economy restructured according to the socialist planned economy.33 Eventually an 
intra-German border was created between east and west. The border was some 69 
miles long, 23 of which ran through Berlin, and separated the GDR from the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Its construction was started in 1961. The Wall that was to 
separate east from west, lasted until the borders were opened in the evening of 
November 1989.34 The Wall was an on-going project, with modifications made on 
a regular basis and at great cost in order to stop East Germans from fleeing west 
and to send a message to West Germany and the wider western world about the 
GDR’s formidability.35 Border guards, usually young and without vast personal or 
professional experience, and having undergone intense indoctrination, patrolled the 
Wall. They were instructed to stop anyone trying to escape, with force. When it did 
occur, it was at night. If the guards noticed someone trying to escape, warning calls 
would be made. Failure to heed calls and warning shots risked the guards firing 
automatic weapons, with fatal results. In one case, the victim was hit in the back 
as he had one hand on the top of the wall.36 There are many heart-breaking stories 
of individuals and families attempting to escape the GDR.37 Alongside this, it is 
31 See TEITEL, supra note 3, at 31-33.
32 Papon v, France App. 54210/00, (15 November 2001). See also Konovov v. Latvia, app. 36376/04, (24 
July 2008).
33 QuestIons on geRMan hIstoRy; Ideas, FoRces, decIsIons FRoM 1800 to the PResent (Bundestag Publications' 
Section, 1992). Concerning West German constitutional law and doctrine see davId P. KoMMeRs, the 
constItutIonal JuRIsPRudence oF the FedeRal RePublIc oF geRMany (Duke University Press 1989).
34 See tIna RosenbeRg, the haunted land; FacIng euRoPe’s ghosts aFteR coMMunIsM (Vintage Books 1996).
35 Ibid.
36 See Peter E. Quint, Judging the Past: The Prosecution of East German Border Guards and the GDR Chain of 
Command, 61 the RevIew oF PolItIcs 303-329 (1999).
37 Ibid. See also PeteR e. QuInt, the IMPeRFect unIon; constItutIonal stRuctuRes oF geRMan unIFIcatIon 
(Princeton University Press 1997). See Inga Markovits, Review Essay: Reconcilable Differences: On Peter 
Quint’s The Imperfect Union, 47 the aMeRIcan J.I.l. 189-217 (1999).
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worth noting that the GDR boasted one of the most extensive secret police networks 
(Staatssicherheit, or Stasi) in order to control all aspects of public and private lives of 
its citizens, the hallmark of a totalitarian state.38
Part of the unification process initiated in 1990 comprised an investigation 
into the decision-making process concerning the regulation of the intra-German 
border, in particular whether criminal liability could be established in relation to 
the illegal use of force. Equally important, in terms of criminal charges and criminal 
prosecutions, was for the new German regime not to appear to stop with the border 
guards.
The 1990 Unification Treaty did not indicate how acts that had been exempted 
from punishment in the GDR would be addressed under the applicable law that 
was to be in force in a reunified Germany. The German legislature did not include 
an amendment that the constitutional provision, the principle of lex retro non agit, 
could not be applied to exclude the punishment of anyone guilty of an act or failure 
to act which at the time it was committed was punishable according to principles 
generally recognised in human rights law. A striking omission, considering the 
country’s transition following the Second World War, with the creation of the 
International Military Tribunal and other related trials of former Nazi officials.39 In 
the end, the answer to the question was to be decided by the courts.40 The courts 
rejected the solution that any punishment of the border guards would be retroactive 
and, as such, unconstitutional, which would lead to their acquittal. This left open 
the possibility for the defendants to be convicted, where the courts could rule that 
the convictions would not be retroactive. The courts could also hold that even if the 
convictions were retroactive, the prohibition against retroactivity is not absolute 
and can be overcome in exceptional situations.41
Eventually, the border guards were put on trial for homicide. Criminal liability 
was determined through inter-temporal criminal law, in other words, the norms 
of either the former GDR law or West German law. Many believed that the force 
used was justified under GDR law.42 In fact, when the appeals eventually reached 
the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), it first ruled that the prohibition 
of retroactivity, found in Article 103 of West German Constitution, was absolute. 
The answer lay in the application of a certain formula in order to identify the gross 
injustice43 of the GDR regime that was accompanied by the abuse of force and the 
restriction of movement at the intra-German border.
Between October 1990 and February 1997 some 78 persons were sentenced 
and 45 acquitted.44 The cases raised some very serious problems under German 
constitutional law (known as the 1949 Basic Law) and under the principle 
prohibiting retroactive punishment. As noted above, the aim of this principle is 
38 See anna FundeR, stasIland (Granta 2003) and The Lives of Others (directed by Florian Henckel von 
Donnersmarck, 2006).  
39 Quint, supra note 36, at 310.
40 It is worthwhile to note that the courts were mainly composed of West German jurists. Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid. 
43 See Künzler, supra note 7.
44 Rudolf Geiger, The German Border Guards Cases and International Human Rights, 9 euRoPean J.I.l. 540-549 
at 541 note 3 (1998).
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to stop a state from punishing political enemies or others arbitrarily ‘by creating 
new rules applicable to events in the past or by punishing without any rule at 
all.’45 The essence of this principle relates to one of trust. At its root is the absence 
of arbitrariness with respect to the rules to be applied to acts committed in the 
past and present. The idea is key in the post-totalitarian law discourse, where legal 
narratives are concerned with themes of uncertainty, fear and terror – all three 
elements motivating the measures that aim to restore or establish a democratic 
system based on the rule of law – in which these main aspects of repressive and 
arbitrary rule are absent.
Some scholars argue that the border guards’ convictions violate this principle of 
non-retroactivity because, under the GDR law applicable at the time, the guards’ 
acts may have been legal in many instances.46 One key law, for example, was the 
1982 Border Law. The law provided the statutory basis for the Wall and made 
it legal for the border guard to employ deadly force at the border to prevent an 
escape, many of which were classed as felonies. And, as noted above, soldiers were 
hardly ever prosecuted or disciplined for using deadly force at the Wall.47
The position of the court required careful thinking, as the prosecution for an 
act that was legal when it took place could involve the imposition of retroactive 
punishment. This principle is enshrined in Article 103(2) German Basic Law, which 
states that ‘an act can only be punished if its criminality was determined by law 
before the act was committed’ and included in the 1990 Unification Treaty that set 
out the legal framework for the accession of the GDR into the Federal Republic, 
noted above. The response to this criticism was that the GDR’s border regime 
reflected the numerous injustices of the regime. For these voices, it was important to 
criminally punish these acts. So, the Border Guards cases reflected the clash between 
two principles: the first holding that reprehensible acts should be subjected to 
criminal punishment and the second that no act should go unpunished without a 
legal prohibition that was in force at the time the act was committed.48
In his seminal examination of the cases, Quint identifies the common themes 
that bound these judgments rendered by the German Federal Court of Justice 
together and, in doing so, showed the delicate and in many ways insurmountable 
hurdles that seemed to obstruct the moral case of seeking justice, without violating 
the maxim of retrospective justice.49 In fact the courts adopted a blend of both 
approaches to address the clash outlined in the previous paragraph. These 
themes concerned the meaning of justice and punishment, as well as adhering to 
procedural legality in the criminal law. The German Federal Court of Justice (the 
Bundesgerichtshof, or BGH), as the court of last resort (or supreme court, on all 
criminal and civil law matters), argued that a proper interpretation of GDR law 
45 Quint, supra note 36 at 309.
46 Ibid. Künzler, supra note 7; Günther Jakobs, Vergangenheitsbewältigung durch Strafrecht? Zur 
Leitungsfähigkeit des Strafrechts nach eimen politischen Umbruch, in veRgangenheItsbewaltIgung duRch 
Recht 37-64 (Josef Isensee ed. Duncker and Humboldt, 1992), Silke Laskowski, Unrecht – Strafrecht – 
Gerechtigkeit: Die Probleme des Rechtsstaats mit dem DDR-Unrecht’26 JuRIstIsche aRbeItsblätteR 151-166 (1994) 
and Horst Dreier, Gustav Radbruch und die Mauerschützen, 52 JuRIsten ZeItung 421-434 (1997).
47 At times they were rewarded. Quint, supra note 36 at 304.
48 Ibid., p. 310.
49 Ibid.
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could in fact criminalise the shootings at the Wall.50 This approach suggests that 
the actions would never have been prosecuted under the GDR. The retroactivity 
question could be addressed, however, if the acts were already criminal under 
GDR law at the time they were committed. In order to reach this result the courts 
considered the Border Law, which, as noted above, provided the statutory basis 
for the use of force at the Wall. The Court’s approach was rigid and it held that 
the statute denied the border guards defence, incorporating human rights in its 
argument, which meant, in turn, that relevant provisions of the 1969 (amended 
1974) GDR Constitution needed to be interpreted. Identifying provisions related to 
the right to life, the Court argued that the GDR constitution provided for an implicit 
right to life that was applicable in most cases. The constitutional right, along with 
other considerations, had a limiting effect on the defence available to the guards 
under the Border Law.51
For some critics, although the GDR Constitution contained numerous basic 
rights, this particular interpretation ‘embodied a radical revision of GDR legal 
history.’52 The Communist Party would never have allowed such an interpretation.53 
But the Court referred to other provisions in the GDR Constitution, justifying this 
approach by establishing that the GDR constitution possessed validity outside 
Communist Party orders and state practice. The Court interpreted the Border 
Law through this constitutional lens, referring to the principle of proportionality 
(relevant to the use of force), to argue that the Border Law did not permit the use of 
deadly force against an unarmed person peacefully trying to flee across the border. 
Not surprisingly, this approach has troubled a number of commentators, who do 
not see any justification for this approach, finding that the GDR would have to 
have changed its identity to accommodate the human rights interpretation.54The 
Court’s interpretation saw the GDR Constitution as a western (and West German) 
document; its ruling was upheld by the CC, which refused to review the findings 
of the lower courts.55 The rejection of the retroactive application of the law was 
a rescue mission that entailed the lifting out of a specific notion of justice from 
a draconian legal framework (it was perceived as such) based on a creative 
interpretation that drew its inspiration from a meta-justice framework.
In discussing the second approach concerning the absolute nature of 
retroactivity, Quint recalled the work of Gustav Radbruch, the eminent German 
legal philosopher, known for his compelling writings on justice and the criminal 
liability of Nazi officials.56 The Radbruch interpretation, or formula, is one that 
has been identified, in varying degrees, by post-Communist constitutional courts 
when adjudicating cases concerning human rights abuses committed by former 
50 See the ‘Shootings at the Berlin Wall Case’, BGHst Band 39 S.1 (1992). The English translation of the 
judgment, along with the original German case transcript, can be found in RayMond youngs, souRcebooK 
oF geRMan law 620-681 (Cavendish, 2002).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 312 and Künzler, supra note 7.
53 Ibid.
54 Künzler, supra note 7.
55 Quint, supra note 26, 556-557.
56 See Quint, supra note 26, and Paulson, supra note 26.
57 See Sadurski, supra note 25, at 249-262, discussing retroactive extensions of statutes of limitation.
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Communist officials.57 It is not difficult to see why the arguments are so compelling 
and appealing to scholars setting key questions in a temporal perspective. Radbruch 
was Professor of Law at the University of Heidelberg who played an important 
role in post-war legal thinking in Germany. Originally, Radbruch embraced the 
legal and jurisprudential school of legal positivism, which supported the view 
that the rules set down by the authorities of the state constitute law, regardless 
of how one evaluates the content of those rules. This interpretation was revisited 
following the Second World War, when Radbruch contemplated the idea that the 
acts of the Holocaust and other acts could go unpunished on the grounds that they 
were positive laws under the Nazis and that their punishment would be prohibited 
under the doctrine of non-retroactivity.58
When revisiting and reflecting on the aspects of the German Nazi regime, 
Radbruch was also engaging with critical legal and jurisprudential questions. He 
argued that the principle of non-retroactivity was one of many and agreed that 
it is a strong principle, but that it must be weighed against other principles of 
justice. According to him, the principle is resilient enough to prevail under most 
circumstances, even in the case of some unjust statutes. But the principle could be 
overcome if the contradiction between the statute and justice reaches an unbearable 
degree where the statute constitutes incorrect law. This is an important part of his 
theory. Much of the legislation enacted at time (1933-1945) reached this unbearable 
limit to justify regarding it as invalid or incorrect law.59 In a stark move away 
from legal positivism, Radbruch called upon a concept of meta-justice, or higher 
principles of justice, when arguing for accountability on the part of officials, in this 
case German Nazis, for human rights atrocities. For the legal theorist, norms lose 
their legal character or legal validity when they are unjust, even if they are socially 
effective and legally enacted.60 For Radbruch, in this context the law is not only 
wrong, but possesses no legal quality. It is in this fashion that Radbruch rejected 
legal positivism as a failure: his formula heralds the influence of natural law in 
German jurisprudence. It is based on approving the retrospective application of a 
higher principle of justice in situations where the ‘contradiction between positive 
law and justice reaches an intolerable level.’61 In other words, the misapplication is 
a question of what is unjust (unrichtiges Recht) and resulting in unequal justice.62 
The debates arising from the Radbruch formula were also deliberated famously 
in the Hart-Fuller correspondence of the 1950s, which continues to resonate to 
the present day.63 One of the key aspects of their debate went to the heart of the 
58 Quint, supra notes 26 and 36.
59 See, for example, P.c. caldwell, PoPulaR soveReIgnty and the cRIsIs oF geRMan constItutIonal law; the 
theoRy and PRactIce oF weIMaR constItutIonalIsM (Duke University Press, 1997); weIMaR; a JuRIsPRudence 
oF cRIsIs 1-39, 41 -65 (A. Jacobson and B. Schlink, eds., B Cooper trans., University of California Press 
2000) and a.J. nIcholls, weIMaR and the RIse oF hItleR (Macmillan, 3rd ed. 1991).
60 Quint, supra notes 26 at 543-552 and 36 at 314-320.
61 See Robert Alexy, In Defence of Radbruch’s Formula, in RecRaFtIng the Rule oF law: the lIMIts oF legal 
oRdeR 16 (David Dyzenhaus, ed. Hart Publishing1999).
62 Přibáň, supra note 23 at 152.
63 See Hart, supra note 26 at 618-621 and Fuller, supra note 26 at 644-648. See also Kif Augustine Adams, 
What is Just?: The Rule of Law and Natural Law in the Trials of Former East German Border Guards, 29 
stanFoRd J.I.l. 271-314 (1993) and Manfred J. Gabriel, Coming to Terms with the East German Border Guards 
Cases, 38 coluMbIa J. tRans. l. 376-418 (1999).
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meaning of law. If laws are meant to organise society, then rules are the signposts 
as to what is legal and what the consequences are of illegal actions. Both Hart 
and Fuller examine the substance and order of the rules. Where Hart identifies 
the general ingredients that comprise the legal system, Fuller views the law as 
possessing an internal morality that determines its order.64 Such a measuring tool 
requires the law to be transparent and non-retroactive. This latter feature, on the 
surface, might seem to run counter to the Radbruch formula. In fact, it is because 
the rule of law is at stake that retrospective justice is justified in special situations 
that are characterised by historical and political distortions. According to Přibáň, 
the ‘legal imagination’ that is required is in effect the application of law in an effort 
to reclaim the ‘original social function of law.’65 Fuller’s position in fact answered 
the dilemma that post-dictatorial regimes faced when seeking to prosecute crimes 
committed by the predecessor regime, the risk remained that the rule of law would 
be undermined in the process, if the acts themselves were not considered criminal 
at the time of their commission. Fuller advanced the view that retrospective justice 
supports the ‘constitutive principle of the rule of law’ that ‘all crimes shall be 
prosecuted even if they may be treated as legal acts by a tyrannical power.’66 
The formula also raises problem, as it provides scant guidance in determining 
what reprehensible act justifies retroactive prosecution and punishment. So, while 
some commentators argue that the transgressions of the GDR were not comparable 
to the vast war crimes and mass genocide of the German Nazi regime, which 
justified the application of the formula,67 others contend that the GDR offences 
reached the threshold that justifies retroactive prosecution and punishment 
under the Radbruch formula.68 As a means to resolve these questions, the courts 
refer to key international human rights instruments to help explain which past 
violations can give rise to present prosecution under the Radbruch formula. So, 
if GDR officials violated important provisions of the international human rights 
instruments, these violations are likely to be sufficiently serious to justify present 
prosecution. In this way, Radbruch’s formula becomes more tangible because it is 
located in specific legal instruments.69 However, the Federal Court of Justice uses 
the formula to find the true law or heart of the GDR Constitution, arguing that it 
was perverted by a corrupt regime and state practice.70 In the case concerning the 
accountability of higher officials, the FCC, as noted above, utilises the formula as a 
weighing exercise to show that there are stronger considerations of justice that take 
priority over non-retroactivity.
The Border Guards cases symbolised the repressive nature of the East German 
regime, and the pursuit of justice was especially stressed after it was clear that the 
criminal prosecution of leading Communist officials, such as the GDR’s former 
64 Ibid.
65 Přibáň, supra note 23, at 151.
66 Ibid., p. 152
67 Quint, supra note 26.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 ‘Shootings at the Berlin Wall Case’, BGHst Band 39 S.1, in youngs, supra note 50 at 659, 661 and Quint, 
supra note 26 at 557-559.
71 See RosenbeRg, supra note 33.
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leader Eric Honecker, was not going to crystallise.71 When other post-Communist 
states began to contemplate legal measures dealing with the past, the East German 
cases were examined closely as a sort of blueprint. The judgments were marked 
out for the application of natural law, relevant for two reasons. First, it was a 
powerful comment about legal positivism and its failure and inadequacy to resolve 
questions about justice emerging from post-Communist legal orders. Secondly, the 
application of the Radbruch formula was one of hope – the hope to see justice done 
in the face of serious human rights abuses. It was a call for a fidelity to the law. 
In this narrative, at a practical level, states could look to two important sources: 
national developments, in the form of what was occurring in neighbouring states, 
and international human rights law, specifically the ECHR. Radbruch arguably 
could not have foreseen that East German law would be interpreted through a West 
German lens, or that his theory would become such an integral temporal formula.
At the ECtHR, the East German border guards (and their superiors) were 
heard in two applications against Germany. The Court examined whether it was 
compatible with Article 7(1) for the courts of a unified Federal Republic to convict 
men, for actions which the applicants argued had not been criminal according to 
the law and practice of the GDR. The three applicants in the case of Streletz, Kessler 
and Krenz v. Germany had held senior posts in the East German regime.72 Owing to 
their role, they had participated in decisions made by higher officials concerning the 
GDR’s border-policing regime. As such, they shared responsibility for the deaths 
of a number of individuals who had attempted to escape to West Berlin between 
1971 and 1989 and who had been killed by shots discharged by East German border 
guards or as a result of land mines. The applicant in the case of K.–H.W. had served 
as a soldier in the GDR border guard. In 1973, as a twenty-year-old officer, he fatally 
shot a person attempting to swim to West Berlin.73
Interestingly, the German courts, which convicted the applicants, did not 
reply to the argument that the acts in question had amounted to ‘crimes against 
humanity’ or had been criminal according to the general principles of international 
law. In fact, the main thread that runs through a case like the Shootings at the Berlin 
Wall is the question of whether the criminal law applicable to the GDR at the times 
that the shootings took place is more or less severe that its Federal German Republic 
counterpart.74 The latter was chosen as the basis for conviction, and as discussed 
above, the courts held that the crimes had been prohibited by GDR law on the 
dates they were committed, relying on the fact that the GDR had signed the 1966 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees, 
inter alia, the right to life and the freedom of movement, and enacted a number of 
statutory provisions protecting the right to life and restricting the use of lethal force 
to the prevention of serious crime.75 The GDR ratified the ICCPR in 1974, which 
entered into force in 1976, but ‘neglected to use the agreement in accordance with 
Art. 51 of the DDR [GDR] Constitution as an opportunity for internal statutory 
72 Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany 33 EHRR 751 (2001)
73 K.-H.W. v. Germany 36 EHRR 1081(2003)
74 ‘Shootings at the Berlin Wall Case’, BGHst Band 39 S.1, in youngs, supra note 50 at 621.
75 Ratification was another point of contention. It was argued that the ICCPR was not law, as it was never 
ratified.
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amendments and have it ‘confirmed’ on this occasion by the People’s Chamber in 
accordance with the said constitutional provision.’76 It is important to note that the 
events in the K.–H.W. case took place before the ratification of the ICCPR.77 
The practice of the East German authorities, however, for which the applicants 
in Streletz were partly responsible, was to encourage border guards to disregard 
the legislation and to annihilate border violators. It is important to recall that 
throughout its existence the East German regime denied its populace freedom 
of movement. The Wall as a response to the wave of persons escaping west, 
and preventing escapes was high on the agenda in terms of border control; the 
preventive actions and crimes that are considered in this discussion occurred 
from the 1960s until the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. In the event 
of a successful crossing, the guards on duty could expect to be the subject of an 
investigation by the military prosecution, calling into question the role of duress. 
In the same case, the Court observed that GDR statute law, together with 
the provisions of the international treaties, had provided a clear prohibition on 
disproportionate and arbitrary killing. As such, the applicants could not argue that, 
in light of GDR state practice, their conviction as accessories to murder had not 
been foreseeable, since they themselves had to a great degree been responsible for 
the discrepancy between the legislation and practice. The treatment of knowledge 
has been a point of contention between scholars as to the harshness of the decision 
to uphold the conviction (albeit a milder sentence, following GDR law, was applied) 
and whether the decision itself was legally sound (as a re-interpretation of GDR 
law).78
The Court’s finding of no violation to Article 7 in the K.–H.W. case appears 
somewhat severe when placed in the context set out above. Three of the seventeen 
judges in the European Court of Human Rights’ Grand Chamber dissented. The 
applicant had been a young and junior soldier, who had undergone a process 
of indoctrination and also been ordered to protect the border ‘at all costs.’79 In 
terms of knowledge, this entailed the information that he would be subject to an 
investigation if he allowed a fugitive successfully to escape from East Germany. 
However, the Court held that the GDR statute was accessible to all, and that ‘even 
a private soldier could not show total, blind obedience to orders which flagrantly 
infringed not only the GDR’s own legal principles but also internationally 
recognised human rights.’80 On the issues of foreseeability and knowledge, the 
ECtHR’s Justice Nicolas Bratza opined
I accept…that the situation in the GDR was such that the applicant could hardly have foreseen at 
the time that his actions would result in his prosecution for the offence of intentional homicide. 
But this is a very different question from the one facing the Court, namely whether the applicant 
could reasonably have foreseen that his actions amounted to such an offence. While this question 
may be open to differing opinions, I can find no reason to depart from the considered opinion of 
the national courts that opening fire on a defenceless person, who was attempting to swim away 
76 ‘Shootings at the Berlin Wall Case’, BGHst Band 39 S.1, in youngs, supra note 50 at 649.
77 See Magdalena FoRowIcZ, the RecePtIon oF InteRnatIonal law In the euRoPean couRt oF huMan RIghts 
175-179 (Oxford University Press, 2010).
78 K.-H.W. v. Germany 36 EHRR 1081(2003)
79 ‘Shootings at the Berlin Wall Case’, BGHst Band 39 S.1, in youngs, supra note 50, at 625.
80 K.-H.W. v. Germany 36 EHRR 1081(2003), para. 75.
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from East Berlin and who posed no threat to life or limb, so clearly breached any principle of 
proportionality that it was foreseeable that it violated the legal prohibition on killing.81
To recall Radbruch
[a]n order is an order’, the soldier is told. ‘A law is a law’, says the jurist. The soldier, however, 
required neither by duty nor by law to obey an order whose object he knows to be a felony or 
misdemeanour, while the jurist – since the last of the natural lawyers died out a hundred years 
ago – recognizes no such exceptions to the validity of the law or to the requirement of obedience 
by those subject to it.82
The two cases play an important role in the transitional justice narrative, shown 
in their complexity because of the number of agents involved, including the guards, 
victims and victims’ families, and national governments (then and present). The 
cases are used in current discourses in Poland and other European states. But the 
European Court ruling does not do justice to the specific legal narratives that can 
be identified in the German courts’ reasoning, which were upheld by the European 
Court of Human Rights.
In this further development of this question in the post-1989 period, one already 
identifies in the Streletz judgment the balancing exercise that is undertaken by 
the Court with respect to Article 7. It is clear that the Court is in favour of such 
prosecutions with the view of meeting the objectives of an ‘effective political 
democracy.’83 An additional point in favour of prosecutions is related to the right 
to life of the victims of the shootings. It is also worth noting the decision of Kononov 
to show the significance for certain states and regions, such as the Baltic States.84 
In May 1944, Kononov, together with a partisan group, attacked a village on the 
grounds that the inhabitants were suspected of collaborating with the Nazis. The 
details of the attack are violent, and several villagers were killed. Kononov was 
viewed as a war hero in Soviet Latvia and it was a shock to him and others when he 
was prosecuted for war crimes in the 1990s. A highly politicised case in Latvia and 
Russia by the time it reached the Grand Chamber of the Court, the decision showed 
that the key source of tension for the principle of retrospective justice rests with 
foreseeability and knowledge. In this case the Court had to decide whether, at the 
time of the offence, international law provided a legal basis to convict Kononov for 
war crimes and whether he could have foreseen that his actions would make him 
guilty of those offences. The Court also had to consider how statutory limitations 
should be treated under Article 7. As noted above in the case of SW, in relation to 
Article 7, the ECtHR does not reject the gradual clarification of the criminal law 
through judicial interpretation, as long as it is consistent with the essence of the 
office and is reasonably foreseeable. As the applicant was a commanding military 
officer, it should have been foreseeable that his actions would constitute war crimes 
81 Ibid.
82 Gustav Radbruch, Five Minutes of Legal Philosphy 1 (1945)(trans. Bonnie Litschewski and Stanley L. 
Paulson), 1 oxFoRd J.l.s, 13-15, (2006). 
83 Ibid. See Simon Atrill, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in Comparative Perspective, PublIc law 107 – 131 (2005).
84 See Korberly v. Hungary, app. 9174/02, (19 September 2008) and Jorgic v. Germany, app. 74613/01, (12 
July 2007).
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for which he could be criminally prosecuted. The majority was not concerned that 
the relevant international laws, on which the national law was based, were not 
published in the Soviet Union, including Latvia, which was a part of the USSR, as 
Latvia SSR, at the time. Because international law does not prescribe a time limit to 
war crimes the conviction was effected by a statute of limitations. Buyse notes that
each transition from a repressive regime to more democratic forms of government has led to 
new perspectives in a country’s history. The power struggle between the new and old powers 
produces different narratives of the oppressor and the oppressed, about the significance of key 
events and persons and more broadly about right and wrong.85
Sometimes, it appears as if a court oversteps its boundary, which, in the eyes 
of some, becomes the ‘dispenser of transitional justice.’86 The cases of Papon 
and Kononov illustrate how biographies once considered reputable may become 
criminalised as retroactive extensions to statutes of limitations87 continue to be 
debated and are shaped by political and historical narratives about events that bind 
post-dictatorial societies. Sometimes the
transitional context thus does not seem to affect the case law on historical debates. Rather 
the effect works the other way around: the Court squarely positions such debates under the 
protective scope – and high level at that – of the freedom of expression…[t]his means in practice 
that the European Convention on Human Rights supports the shift in transitional societies from a 
single state-directed perspective on the past to a plurality of voices.88
Not only are cases such as the Border Guards distinct to Germany, there are 
specific moral and legal dilemma’s that arise and that are peculiar to transitional 
justice narratives found elsewhere. It is clear, however, that it is a specific set of 
problems that accompanies these narratives. The next section discusses Polish 
developments, and shows well the complexities of the problem at hand.
POLISH CASE STUDY
The collapse of Communism in 1989 brought with it the call for law to work 
backwards that indicated the desire of some states and their respective populace 
to address the demand for retributive justice.89 One of the hurdles the states faced 
was the statute of limitations, which meant that the only way to open these cases 
would be to revoke the periods of limitations themselves. Such a move would mean 
that certain acts that were officially legal under the Communist regime should be 
now regarded as illegal ex post facto. Poland has been described by some scholars 
85 tRansItIonal JuRIsPRudence and the echR: JustIce, PolItIcs and RIghts 131–170 (Antoine Buyse and 
Michael Hamilton, eds., Cambridge University Press  2011).
86 Korbely v. Hungary. ECHR app. 9174/02, (2008 ). See also James Sweeney, ‘Freedom of Religion and 
Democratic Transition’, in ibid, 103-130 at 124, also Michael Hamilton and Antoine Buyse, ‘Introduction’, 
ibid, 7-8 and ibid, 138-141. On biographies, see Catherine Epstein, The Politics of Biography 128 daedalus 1-30 
(1999).
87 To use Sadurski’s phrase, supra note 25.
88 buyse and haMIlton, supra note 84 at 141.
89 The development could be attributed to the increasing important of international human rights in 
Latin and South America. See elIn sKaaR, JudIcIal IndePendence and huMan RIghts In latIn aMeRIca: 
vIolatIons, PolItIcs and PRosecutIon (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).
Retroactive Laws and Notions of Retrospective Justice: 
Key Aspects of the German and Polish Experiences
18
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
as lenient in its approach to retroactivity.90 In actual fact, both Poland and Hungary 
have been treated by commentators as being ‘more liberal and reform-minded than 
other post-communist countries and undoubtedly represented the first group of 
countries in which round-table talks played a central role’.91 Aptly noted by Přibáň, 
both states underwent a ‘more gradual and evolutionary transition,’92 as compared 
to the sudden political transformations that characterised the transitions of former 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, or at the extreme, Romania. In these latter cases the 
regime held on to power until the very last minute that was usually accompanied by 
violence. It is true that Poland had the 1989 Round Table Talks that would influence 
retrospective justice, specifically with respect to holding former Communist officials 
criminally liable for past injustices. In other words, one could argue that the pace of 
reform in this area was piecemeal, to the dismay of many who hoped to seek justice 
for Communist crimes.93 As noted elsewhere at the Round Table Talks, the Polish 
judiciary took its cue from the government in adopting a policy of a thick line (gruba 
kreska) approach to itself. The historical narratives concerning Communist rule and 
post-Communist transitions about who assumed and relinquished power continued 
to be dictated, to a certain extent, by the former Communist regime.
Retroactivity of a law may not have been expressly provided for in the Polish 
Constitution at the time, but quickly became one of the fundamental components 
of the rule of law, as interpreted by the Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał 
Konstytucyjni).94 Brzezinski observes that by 1992 the Tribunal had established and 
reaffirmed the rule-of-law clause as comprising, inter alia, prohibiting retroactive 
laws.95 Moreover, the Tribunal also defined certain areas not protected by the rule-
of-law clause, such as rights obtained in an unjust manner and crimes committed 
during the Stalinist period. Since then, the Tribunal has developed additional 
procedural and institutional components. These Polish narratives concerning 
retrospective justice show the ways in which discourses are used for different and 
opposite purposes. In other words, history affects the discourses where different 
historic moments influence narratives, or even opt in favour of legislation that 
addresses specific periods and crimes; in Poland this occurred with respect to Nazi 
or Stalinist crimes.96 The narratives also show the consequences of unresolved 
grievances.
The next section addresses a Polish case, rarely discussed in the English 
language, which fits into the transitional justice narrative, in particular the relevance 
of the Border Guards cases and the on-going issues arising from the application of 
the Radbruch formula.
90 FIJalKowsKI, supra note 30, in particular 117-172.
91 Přibáň, supra note 23, at 143.
92 Ibid. See also the Round table talKs oF 1989; the genesIs oF hungaRIan deMocRacy (A. Bozoki ed., CEU 
Press 2002).
93 See, for example, Stan,  supra note 23, at 76-101 and Adam Czarnota, Between Nemesis and Justitia: 
Dealing with the Past as a Constitutional Process, in Czarnota et al., supra note 25 at 123-129.
94 Judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucyjni), K 7/90, pp. 50–51 (22 August 
1990).
95 MaRK bRZeZInsKI, the stRuggle FoR constItutIonalIsM In Poland 171 (St Martin’s Press, 1998).
96 See FIJalKowsKI, supra note 30, at 117-172.
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MARTIAL LAW CASE
‘Politics should conform to the law and not law to politics.’97
In December 2007, the Polish Supreme Court was asked to respond to legal 
questions brought by the disciplinary court that was convened to hear the appeal 
of the prosecutor from the Chief Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against 
the Polish Nation (Głowna Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu),98 
against the refusal to waive judicial immunity of a judge, now retired, so he 
could be charged with the commission of Communist crimes (in relation to the 
adjudication of criminal cases under the martial law decree). An expanded seven-
judge bench of the Supreme Court considered whether a request to waive judicial 
immunity could be regarded as ‘obviously unfounded’ (oczywiście bezzasadne). 
The crux of the legal question, as asserted in the Resolution, is found in the legal 
position as it was then, namely under the Polish People’s Republic (1945-1989). It is 
a separate issue if those judges interpreting the provisions of the 1952 Constitution 
regarded their conclusion as obvious or whether they reached it through judicial 
interpretation.99 Significantly, the case considered the retroactivity of the effect of 
the martial law decree, which was not published in the Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of 
Laws) until several days after it took effect. It is important to note that under Article 
4 ICCPR no derogations from Article 15, even under martial law, are allowed. This 
factor was considered alongside the relevant provisions found in the 1952 Polish 
Constitution by the Supreme Court.100
The Supreme Court acknowledged that Poland had several international law 
obligations arising from the ICCPR, which was ratified by the state in 1977.101 
It noted that Articles 4 (emergency situations) and 15 (applicable crimes) were 
the key constitutional provisions. The Court, relying on research on supremacy 
of international law, argued that at that time Poland did not have international 
law obligations (under the ICCPR), as it was not incorporated into the domestic 
law further to the Council of State (Rada Państwa), the only organ that had that 
competence. In the Court’s eyes, the issue of retroactivity did not exist, a factor that 
97 Jerzy Zajadło, Ius, lex i Tybunał Konstytucyjny (Ius, lex and the Constitutional Tribunal), in wSPółczeSne 
PRobleMy PRawa (conteMPoRaRy legal PRobleMs) 87 (A. Polańska et al., eds., Gdynia Higher School of 
Administration and Business 2011).  The edited volume is dedicated to Prof. Jerzy Młynarczyk.
98 The Commission is part of the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej), and 
is its criminal investigation service. Further details are available at: http://ipn.gov.pl/en/about-the-
institute/structure/offices/chief-commission-for-the-prosecution-of-crimes-against-the-p (last accessed 
8 March 2013).
99 Supreme Court Resolution from 20 December 2007, I KZP 37/07, OSNKW no. 12.2007, item 86.
100 The Court revisited a question raised in 1992, when hearings were initiated against the country’s 
last Communist leader General Wojciech Jaruzelski (Jaruzelski was Head of State until 1990). Imposing 
martial law was not a crime, as the Polish Constitution allowed martial law when the security of the 
state was endangered. The question was whether the state was indeed in danger; thus the charges were 
based on technicalities. The first charge found that only Parliament could call martial law, not the State 
Council, as had been done. The second charge found that the decree was not published in the Dziennik 
Ustaw (Journal of Laws) until several days after it took effect.
101 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last accessed 8 January 2013).
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was supported by Article 121 of the 1969 Criminal Code and the 1952 Constitution. 
The Court rejected the argument that judges had an obligation at that time to review 
the constitutionality of the provision. 
The 2007 decision was extensively critiqued; one key commentator in the area, 
Jerzy Zajadło, criticised the Court for not taking the opportunity to rule that judges 
had the moral responsibility to maintain fidelity to the law and be accountable for 
the application of unjust laws.102 On the surface, it appears that the Resolution does 
little to restore public trust and security to ensure that laws are not arbitrary and 
retroactive. On the other hand, it could be argued that the law at the time did not 
prohibit retroactive application of the law. Importantly, the state was not based on 
the rule of law as understood in its contemporary context of legal certainty and the 
non-arbitrary application of the law, transparency, and due process.  It should be 
noted that the Resolution did not form an obstacle in the criminal prosecution of 
judges who committed crimes against humanity in the application of the martial 
law decree retroactively.
The case was eventually referred to the Constitutional Tribunal. The ruling 
was far from unanimous – out of 14 judges, six dissented on the grounds the 
case was outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The fact that almost half of the 
judges dissented points to the complexity and far-reaching consequence of the 
case. The intricacy of the case rests with the issue of judicial immunity becoming 
a constitutional matter, further to the relevant procedural law, and the manner in 
which the case was framed as a legal question to the Tribunal. The dissenting judges 
argued that it was a matter for the courts as a case concerning the application of 
the law. The judgment is fascinating, not least owing to its political and historical 
context, but also because it questions the normative basis of judicial decisions. 
Scholars have maintained that judges adjudicating cases during the martial law 
period would not have been immune to the consequences the decision would have 
on the civil liberties and lives of the defendants.103 This paper focuses on issues 
that underpin and are hidden in the background of the case (which is not meant to 
diminish its importance) that concern law and justice and that links the position of 
one of its dissenting judges. 
Not surprisingly, the context of the case (lifting immunity of judges who broke 
the maxim of lex retro non agit) provoked a contentious ideological and political 
debate. The Tribunal rendered its judgment in October 2010. For the Tribunal, it was 
a case concerning: Article 7 (concerning the function of public authorities), Article 10 
(concerning the separation of powers), and Article 42(1) (concerning retroactive law) 
102 See Barbara Grabowska, Bezprawie normatywne (Unjust Norms), available at http://www.
prawaczlowieka.edu.pl/index.php?orzeczenie=1a16327c0d874646ac918dada4ce6e12cbe77074-b0 (last 
accessed 1 February 2013).
103 See Andrzej Rzepliński, Przystosowanie ustroju sądownictwa do potrzeb państwa totalitarnego w Polsce 
w latach 1944-1956 (Adapting the Administration of Justice to the Needs of the Totalitarian State in Poland in 
the Period 1944-1956), PrzeSTęPSTwa Sędziów i ProkuraTorów w. PoLSce LaT 1944 – 1956 9-37 (crimeS of 
Judges and PRosecutoRs In Poland FRoM 1944-1956 (W. Kulesza & A. Rzepliński, eds., Instytut Pamięci 
Narodowej, 2000). See also, andrzeJ rzePLińSki, SądownicTwo w. PoLSce LudoweJ: między dySPozycyinoScią 
a. niezawiSLoScią (The Judiciary in PeoPLe’S PoLand: beTween comPLiance and indePendence (Pokolenie 
1989). 
Agata Fijalkowski/Frontiers of Legal Research, 1(1), 2013
21
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
of the present 1997 Constitution; Article 7 ECHR104 and Article 15 ICCPR,105 where 
the Tribunal had to determine the conformity of the first sentence of Article 80(2b), 
of the Act of 27 July 2001 on the Law on the Organisation of Common Courts106 to 
the extent to which the reference ‘obviously groundless motion for permission to 
hold a judge criminally liable’ includes a motion for permission to hold a judge 
criminally liable with regard to a judge who, while adjudicating on criminal cases at 
the time when the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland of 22 July 1952107 
was in force applied retroactive criminal provisions. In other words, as these are 
statutory provisions, the question was whether they should be understood in such 
as way that the obvious groundlessness of a motion for permission to hold a judge 
criminally liable encompasses issues which require substantial interpretation of the 
Act to the principle of specificity of legal provisions, which arises from Article 2 
(rule of law clause) of the 1997 Constitution. The Tribunal held that Article 80(2b) 
is inconsistent with Article 2 of the 1997 Constitution and not inconsistent with 
Article 7, Article 10, and Article 42(1) of the present 1997 Constitution, and with 
Article 7 ECHR and Article 15 ICCPR. In other words, the Tribunal’s decision on 
the issue makes the challenged provision concerning competence a constitutional 
matter, when in fact it is an issue that has no normative content. The ruling did not 
comment on the substance of the Resolution.
One of the dissenting judges, Ewa Łętowska, who was Poland’s first 
Ombudsman (1987-1992), asserted that an erroneous procedural decision should 
not be corrected by another wrong answer. By extending the Tribunal’s competence 
over a specific procedural issue concerning judges in the common courts, Łętowska 
saw it as a potential infringement upon the separation of powers (and ultimately, 
judicial independence as it brought Resolutions into the Tribunal’s competence). 
In her opinion, Łętowska bemoaned the fact that bad law will force the Tribunal to 
step into matters that are not in its competence, in an effort to fill in the gaps that it 
itself had created. Presumably, this would imply the Supreme Court was not able 
to make a bold move away from a positivist application of the law. The Tribunal 
had the opportunity to make its position clear with respect to the Supreme Court 
Resolution, and its inability to squarely address two questions: the first related to 
guilt and the second concerning unjust laws. The issue at hand is much simpler than 
the question faced by Radbruch.108 In fact, most of the Tribunal’s judges rejected the 
position of the Supreme Court that applying laws retroactively was a principle that 
did not exist at the time.109 As asserted by Grabowska in her commentary in the 2007 
case, retroactive laws have their place in the spirit or soul of the law (duchu prawa), 
in the sense that they assume a basic foundation of civil liberties.110 In this narrative 
Fuller’s fidelity of law takes on a poignant resonance in relation to the transparency 
of the law. 
104 Dz. U. (Journal of Laws), 1993, No. 61, item 284.
105 Dz. U. (Journal of Laws), 1977, No. 38, item 167.
106 Dz. U. (Journal of Laws), 2001, No. 98, item 1070, as amended.
107 Dz. U. No. 33, 1952, item 232, as amended.
108 Zajadło, supra note 97.
109 The dissenting judges were Ewa Łętowska, Bohdan Zdziennicki, Stanisław Biernat, Adam Jamroz, 
Marek Mazurkiewicz, and Mirosław Wyrzykowski.
110 Grabowska, supra note 102.
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Łętowska takes great pains to distance herself from the majority opinion, 
stressing that her dissent does not imply support for the decision rendered by the 
Supreme Court. Łętowska is the only judge to discuss coming to terms with the past 
at great length. She hints at the issue becoming politicised. Her dissenting opinion 
recalls Radbruch, in particular the significance of knowledge and foreseeability 
within the meta-justice framework. For Łętowska, the way forward is the 
application of Radbruch›s formula as a whole: as an issue of unlawfulness and an 
issue of the lack of guilt where
this fragment of the formula is less popular in the legal discourse. If I had grounds to believe that 
revoking [judicial] immunity would bring about diligent, insightful assessment which would 
be free from any bias or opportunism, with regard to issues concerning immunity, I would 
opt, in similar situations, for a stance that would be clear-cut: revocation of immunity (due to 
actual unlawfulness) and the perspective of objective and unbiased adjudication on a specific 
act (guilt). Neither the Resolution of the Supreme Court, Ref. No. I KZP 37/07, nor the judgment 
of the Constitutional Tribunal, to which I submit my dissenting opinion, incline me to believe 
that, in such a case, we would arrive at a balanced and fair effect of Radbruch’s formula in its 
extensiveness.111
Some commentators would argue that certain decisions, such as the one 
rendered by the Supreme Court, reveal an order that remains hidden away within 
a valid legal framework while its legitimacy is based on an old constitution and 
an old legal order.112 Retrospective justice is an issue that is intrinsically linked to 
trust in the state and the continuity of the law in discontinuity with the past. In this 
vein, political and indeed legal discourses on the subject have indicated that judges 
should take responsibility for applying unjust laws.113 Instead, the ruling creates a 
situation of uncertainty – it is not clear what will happen if a move is made to lift 
judicial immunity of a judge who had adjudicated under martial law and rendered 
unjust verdicts.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The post-Communist legal systems continue to be confronted with unpunished 
offences of the past being time barred not for the usual reasons that some crimes go 
unpunished elsewhere, but for the specific reason that those crimes were inspired, 
mandated and tolerated by the state, as a result of which limitation periods were 
allowed to expire.114 The temporal aspect of retrospective justice has instigated 
several legal narratives that concern justice and how to achieve it by lifting it 
out of the framework of criminal law and its limiting clauses, without damaging 
the democratic potential of a state and its intention to secure the rule of law. It 
is an issue that ranks as one of the most constitutionally important and it haunts 
111 Case concerning Supreme Court Resolution from 20 December 2007, K 10/08, judgment, para. 18 (27 
October 2010).
112 Concerning old orders that remain concealed behind valid legal frameworks see discussions in 
ToTaLiTarian and PoST-ToTaLiTarian Law (Adam Podgórecki and Vittorio Olgiati, eds., Ashgate 1996).
113 See Grabowska, supra note 102.
114 See Sadurski, supra note 25.
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‘legislative bodies, constitutional courts, politicians and the public.’115 As shown, 
the classic framing of the question was conducted by Radbruch and later taken up 
by Hart and Fuller in their famous debate from the 1950s. It was in these debates 
that the role of law reasserted its original social function after experiencing severe 
damage.116 As this case has shown, another substantive legal question arises from 
a peculiar situation that concerns judicial immunity and the application of laws 
retroactively, which, as demonstrated above, goes against the cornerstone of 
criminal law. The element of time, i.e. non-retroactivity, however, can be overcome, 
as the temporal feature also exists with respect to the meta-justice narrative that 
outweighs the arguments for non-retroactivity and permits the application of the 
Radbruch formula.
As part of the notion of substantive justice are international human rights 
norms.117 A court then is faced with a justification based on how general principles 
of justice overrode positive law at the time they were committed or whether it 
acknowledges that the principles of justice are applied retrospectively by the present 
legal framework, the latter dependent very much on the context of the time. Clearly 
the relationship between international law and the domestic law of a state remains 
a highly complex question, with differing positions. A great degree depends on 
the rules adopted by the state itself, and these are likely to distinguish between the 
effect of customary international law and treaties, whether they are self-executing, 
depending on whether a state is monist or dualist. As the East German example 
shows, the failure to enact a statute transposing international law into domestic law 
necessarily reaches the expected conclusion that the norms do not apply. However, 
as shown in the Polish case, the answer is not entirely straightforward. 
Where it is the case that the crimes are not core offences in international law, it is 
unclear whether international law can override domestic law. The court then might 
have to reinterpret past law with a present day lens, which results in a situation 
where the offence is admittedly an offence even with a dictator’s lens, or the legal 
framework of the regime is identified as bad, or in other words, not a rule-of-law 
state. Unfortunately the past lens is more often than not directed by politics. Quint 
notes ‘the greatest clarity and candor are achieved when it is acknowledged that it 
is not really possible to go into past legal systems and change the principles of those 
legal systems for the purposes of achieving a particular result today.’118 Rendering 
such reinterpretations that would likely not have been allowed under dictatorships 
should be rejected. The compelling position is one that is taken by Radbruch, in that 
there are certain values that are more important than the retroactivity principle. This 
position, as noted by Quint, is the most candid as it focuses on present day legal 
principles. However, both case studies in this paper support the position that each 
situation has its own peculiar set of problems and respective histories with which to 
reckon.119 It is important to note is that the aspect of civil liberties and human rights 
within the transitional criminal justice narrative on the question of retrospective 
justice introduces a more permanent character to transitional justice. What Teitel 
115 Přibáň, supra note 23, at 150.
116 Ibid.
117 Quint, supra note 36 at 318-320.
118 Quint, supra note 26, at 563.
119 See Künzler, supra note 7.
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120 Teitel, supra note 27.
121 Ibid., supra note 27, at 91.
122 The Court recognises that the public’s interest must be considered when restricting a debate about the 
past as an important element of transition. See buyse and haMIlton, supra note 82 at 138-141.
has aptly termed ‘transitional justice all the time’ takes in an added meaning as 
we observe the manner in which the transitional justice discourse has shifted from 
what was perceived as exceptional (a post-dictatorial or post-totalitarian period) 
to a more normal state of affairs owing to the vulnerability of what is being tested, 
i.e., key principles and values that are part of the meta-justice narrative.120 Teitel 
observes ‘[a]s a jurisprudence associated with political flux, transitional justice is 
related to a higher politicization of the law and to some degree of compromise in 
rule-of-law standards.’121 In this vein it is important to note the effect of the power 
of political officials on discourses and policy in a nascent and evolving political 
arena. How far the public is allowed into the public debate about legal processes 
dealing with the past forms part of the evolving sphere of freedom of speech and 
may shape relevant policy.122 While the ECtHR places the historic debates under the 
protective umbrella of the freedom of speech, emphasising the ‘plurality of voices’, 
the national debate might reposition a judgment to suit its reading of the past, as 
shown in more recent developments, such as in Kononov. In the Polish experience, 
martial law and the history of the Polish judiciary discloses institutional tensions 
and conflicting legal philosophical positions. It will continue to be debated between 
competing legal, historical and political narratives.
